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the reintroduction of border controls and 
suspension of visa-free travel for two Western 
Balkans states and the growing preoccupation 
with immigration in several EU member-states. 
The states of the Eastern Partnership, engaged 
in taking on, or attempting to meet, stringent 
technical criteria, may have valid concerns as to 
whether their efforts are going to be rewarded.
The EU’s eastern neighbours are concerned 
about two scenarios of the outcome of the 
technical process of meeting EU requirements 
for lifting visa requirements: 
a) a protracted and “open-ended” process, 
which would depend on the “political climate” 
around visa liberalisation in the member-states; 
b) blocking of the decision after meeting the 
technical requirements, and imposing of further 
requirements.
Part I by Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz 
Squaring the technical and 
political challengeS
This study identifies opportunities and barriers 
to the process of visa liberalisation between the 
European Union (EU) and the states of the Eastern 
Partnership, in particular Ukraine, Moldova and 
Georgia. Attention is paid to two key factors: 
technical, involved in the process of adoption, 
implementation and evaluation of action plans, 
and political, centring on the will of the two 
parties (EU and EaP states) to move the process 
forward and complete it successfully. 
Such analysis appears to be particularly timely 
in view of several recent trends, which raise 
questions as to the outcome of the process: 
the delays in the integration of Bulgaria and 
Romania into Schengen and the calls for 
Part I on the wider EU context for achieving political approval of 
visa liberalisation by Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz, Institute of Public  
Affairs, Poland
Part II on the record to date of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine in 
meeting the technical criteria, and recommendations for reforms by 
Nadya Dimitrova,  European Institute, Bulgaria
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no shortcuts on the road to freedom of 
movement for the eu’s eastern neighbours 
Visa-free travel for the EU’s Eastern neighbours will come 
when they meet the technical criteria and EU skeptics’ concerns 
on migration flows are addressed directly and convincingly 
 w.pasos.org
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recommendationS
For the governmentS oF the 
eaStern partnerShip StateS:
 
• The negotiating teams are advised to take a 
proactive approach when it comes to responding 
to the European Commission’s findings of gaps 
in legislative and administrative arrangements. 
This implies firstly prompt and exhaustive 
responses to the Commission’s requests for 
information, in which not only are specific 
problems acknowledged but also timelines for 
tackling them and the responsible authorities are 
indicated. Interviews with Commission officials 
confirm that the unsatisfactory communication 
with the negotiators from some of the applicant 
countries is one of the main current obstacles to 
fast conclusion of the first stage of negotiations 
on visa liberalisation. 
Working out effective mechanisms for sharing 
information within the format of the negotiations 
is crucial for developing trust, which in turn 
is essential for convincing the European 
Commission of the co-operative attitude of the 
Eastern Partnership governments. In turn, the 
applicant states need to recognise the European 
Commission as their ally, vitally interested in the 
success of the negotiations.
• The Cabinets of Ministers have a crucial role 
in making sure that the issues raised during the 
negotiations receive sufficiently high rank in the 
legislative initiative plans and in co-ordinating 
the sectoral implementation strategies. The 
experience of Central European accession to 
the EU and the road towards visa-free travel for 
the Western Balkans countries indicate the need 
for establishing a strong co-ordination centre 
with political authority. Such a centre would 
not only ensure the consistency of actions and 
effective allocation of resources, but also stir the 
administration into action, giving a clear signal 
that the process represents the highest political 
priority on the national agenda. Moreover, 
the Cabinets are well-positioned to collect 
information from the involved ministries and 
agencies, passing it on to the negotiating team, 
thus shortening the communication lines.
recommendationS For the 
governmentS oF eu member-
StateS Supportive oF the proceSS:
  
• Ministries of Foreign Affairs occupy a 
pivotal position in the EU-level forums (such as 
the Council on Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
- COEST) at which the member-states express 
their general concerns on the current state of 
relations and prospects for co-operation with 
Eastern Partnership states. Their activities on 
behalf of the neighbours may take on two forms. 
On the one hand, they may counter some of the 
misconceptions and concerns related to future visa 
liberalisation by supplying factual information on 
To estimate the likelihood of these two scenarios, 
it is necessary to focus on three aspects of the 
problem:
• to what extent the process may be considered 
merely an exercise in meeting technical 
requirements, and to what extent it is open to 
other, more “political” arguments?
• which countries are likely to oppose fast 
conclusion of talks and are going to raise further 
concerns, and which arguments can we expect 
from them?
• what should be the optimal timing and 
contents of advocacy efforts, and what is the 
best strategy for working beyond the Polish EU 
Council Presidency in this regard?
The  study is based on a combination of desk 
and field research. As part of the desk research, 
official documents, expert and press reports 
were surveyed, while the fieldwork consisted 
of personal interviews with 15 respondents, 
carried out in Brussels and Warsaw in May 
2011. The analysis was undertaken in the 
framework of the PASOS/LGI project “Paving 
the road towards visa-free travel between the 
Eastern Partnership countries and the EU”, 
aiming to identify the main factors likely to 
hamper the process of visa liberalisation and 
those stakeholders who need to be targeted 
with advocacy efforts.
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the positive experience of effective management 
of migratory flows across their borders with the 
neighbours, and by disseminating best practices 
in visa administration. 
On the other hand, they need to show 
themselves as credible advocates of the process 
by demonstrating to the “skeptical” EU member-
states that they are able to communicate their 
concerns to the candidates, and come back 
with solid evidence of progress specifically in 
the areas of utmost concern to the skeptics. 
While the dialogue on the technical level is likely 
to continue primarily between the European 
Commission and the Eastern Partnership 
governments, it needs to be complemented 
by vigorous political dialogue between the 
diplomacies of the EU member-states and the 
Eastern Partnership governments. 
 
• As central authorities in the field of Justice and 
Home Affairs, Ministries of Interior are in the 
position to tackle concerns of their counterparts 
in the EU on a whole range of sectoral issues 
(illegal migration, organised crime, corruption). 
They may do so firstly by intensifying operational 
co-operation with the ministries and agencies 
(migration and border services) of the Eastern 
Partnership states (exchanging liaison officers, 
funding study visits, and capacity-building 
projects). Secondly, they may involve their EU 
partners in technical exercises, providing them 
with first-hand experience of progress that the 
Eastern Partnership states are making on the 
ground. Such an “intermediary” role would fulfil 
one of the objectives of the Eastern Partnership 
- transfer of know-how to state administration of 
the beneficiary countries while engaging the 
ministries and agencies of the “skeptical” states 
and gradually winning them over to support of 
the process.
recommendationS For the 
poliSh and daniSh eu council 
preSidencieS:
• The period of the Polish Presidency of the 
Council of the European Union (July-December 
2011) continues to represent a unique 
opportunity for advancing the issue of visa 
liberalisation for the EU’s Eastern Partners. Given 
the preoccupation with other pressing issues (in 
particular, the economic crisis) and the resistance 
of several EU member-states to the prospects of 
visa liberalisation, it is first of all essential that 
the Polish Presidency keep the momentum of the 
progress with the frontrunners, presenting them 
as “success stories” and building foundations for 
further progress under the coming Presidencies 
of countries that do not exhibit a comparable 
level of interest in the issue. 
It is in particular expected that in this period 
Poland will manage to oversee the closing 
of the first stage of the Action Plans with 
Moldova and Ukraine, which would entail also 
the specification of requirements envisioned for 
the second stage and a declaration that full visa 
liberalisation is dependent on fulfilment of a 
set of jointly agreed standards. While it is not 
likely that a date for the ultimate abolition of visa 
requirements is going to be announced in this 
period, communication of a clear perspective 
for the process to continue would represent 
an assurance to the Eastern Partners that their 
genuine efforts at reform will be rewarded.
• At the same time, the Polish Presidency is 
expected to strive for demonstrable progress with 
all the other Eastern Partners, so as to maintain 
the cohesion of the Eastern Partnership initiative. 
The European Commission has initiated talks on 
visa facilitation with Armenia and Azerbaijan 
while efforts will have to be made to commence 
by the end of the year negotiations on the 
adoption of the plan for visa liberalisation 
with Georgia. The latter will be contingent 
on the review of the results of the operation of 
the visa facilitation agreement, and Poland is 
encouraged to call upon the other members of 
the Council to require that such a review be held 
still in 2011.
• While the priorities of the Danish EU Council 
Presidency (January-June 2012) are to be laid 
out only in December 2011, it is essential 
that through the format of the presidency 
trio with Poland and Cyprus work is carried 
out on ensuring consistency of objectives 
and co-ordination of activities among the 
presiding states. The fact that Denmark enjoys 
an opt-out in the area of Justice and Home Affairs 
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Shaping the Stance oF eu 
member-StateS
Visa liberalisation between the EU and the 
countries of the Eastern Partnership is subject to 
constraints, which may be divided into two main 
categories: related to the process itself (and 
consisting of technical and political aspects) 
and reflecting the interests and positions of key 
stakeholders, often going beyond the question 
of the visa regime or relations with Eastern 
Partnership states. 
The two types of constraints are intertwined: those 
member-states who are cautious about stepping 
gives grounds for expecting that Copenhagen 
will keep to its declaration, presented in the list 
of focus areas for its Presidency, doing “its utmost 
to be an honest broker and deal with all the many 
issues in a fair, neutral and effective manner”. The 
first steps of the new Danish centre-left cabinet in 
relaxing the stringent national immigration policy 
also indicate the possibility that the country’s strong 
opposition to any moves relaxing the conditions 
for entry of nationals of Eastern Partnership states 
into the EU may be somewhat tempered. While 
Denmark is not expected to place the issue high 
on the agenda, some hope for the continuity of 
the EU’s policy of continued dialogue with the 
neighbours on this issue is justified.
recommendationS For civil 
Society organiSationS in the 
eaStern partnerShip StateS:
    
• The process of negotiations towards visa 
liberalisation could be made much more transparent 
if think-tanks, research institutes and advocacy 
NGOs became more involved in the process of 
independent assessment of the progress that their 
governments are making towards a broad range 
of governance and human rights indicators. They 
may establish themselves as impartial yet supportive 
witnesses of the government’s efforts, using a 
combination of public events and targeted advice 
to raise officials’ awareness of the commitments 
flowing from the realisation of the Action Plans, 
particularly in the field of human rights. At the 
same time, civil society organisations are set to 
become more visible, adding their voice to that of 
international organisations in identifying areas in 
need of reforms, and suggesting do-able solutions 
for implementing the commitments. 
recommendationS For the non-
governmental advocateS oF the 
proceSS, located in the eu:
• Erosion of the value of free movement by reference 
to European security, which has been observed, 
inter alia, in the tightening of conditions for the 
liberalisation of visas with the Eastern Partnership 
states, must be of concern to organisations and 
networks preoccupied with civil liberties (among 
them Open Society Foundations and PASOS). 
As the growing preoccupation with illegal migration 
undermines a number of the achievements of 
European integration, the issue of upholding the 
values of freedom of movement and civil liberties 
in relations with the neighbours may be presented 
as a matter of larger significance. Furthermore, 
coalitions of NGOs from EU member-states and 
countries of the Eastern Partnership are likely to 
be viewed not merely as advocates of narrow 
interests of selected groups of population, but may 
propel the issue forward as a matter of concern 
to advocates of civil rights in the countries of “old 
Europe”.
up relations with Eastern Partnership countries 
placed certain safeguards into the process so 
as to ensure that it does not progress too fast 
or without due oversight, and the positions held 
on related matters (Schengen evolution and 
enlargement, integration of Western Balkans, 
Mediterranean neighbourhood, domestic 
immigration policy) play a role in shaping 
the stance of member-states towards visa 
liberalisation for the Eastern Partner countries.
Thus it is not possible to separate the technical 
aspects (capacity of Eastern Partnership states for 
meeting obligations) from the broader political 
environment surrounding the issue. This study 
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argues that the larger political issues occupying 
European policy-makers must be dealt with 
head on to avert the possibility of a failure of 
the process leading up to the introduction of a 
visa-free movement between the EU and Eastern 
Partnership states.
The progress of the Eastern Partnership states 
toward visa liberalisation is conditional upon:
• Ability to accept, implement and demonstrate 
the legal, institutional and technical requirements 
of the visa facilitation and liberalisation 
agreements. Fast progress is possible at earlier 
stages; however, the division of the liberalisation 
process into two stages, of which the second 
one is very broad in scope, puts serious limits 
on the prospects of fast conclusion. 
• Progress of a pivotal state (Ukraine) 
determines the chances of the other Eastern 
Partnership states. Unlike the Western Balkans, 
where the ultimate accession perspective 
allowed case-by-case treatment, the absence 
of such perspective and the disparity in size 
(hence potential migratory impact) focus the 
attention of EU policymakers on the progress 
and outcome of the visa-liberalisation process 
with Ukraine. This connection is reinforced by 
the insistence on the part of the opponents of 
fast visa liberalisation on demonstration that the 
relaxation of conditions of travel for nationals of 
one Partnership state does not reduce migration 
security in the entire neighbourhood of the EU.
• Division of the visa liberalisation process 
into two stages and the requirement to meet 
the technical standards, envisioned in the 
first stage of the action plan (implemented by 
Ukraine and Moldova), places emphasis on the 
technical capacity of Eastern Partner institutions 
and elevates the role of the Ministries of Interior 
of member-states in verifying the progress. EU 
member-states skeptical towards the prospect 
of relaxation of controls have been critical of 
the process of evaluation of Western Balkan 
states’ progress in meeting technical criteria, 
which in their view did not grant the experts 
from member-states sufficient opportunity to 
monitor the performance of state agencies and 
to ensure that proper controls were in place. 
What are the implications for the advocates 
of visa liberalisation, firstly the civil society 
organisations in Eastern Partnership states 
and those member-states (like Poland and 
other new members) that welcome the 
prospect? Firstly, we may actually learn some 
lessons from the experience of accession and 
Schengen integration preparations - the initial 
preoccupation with dates and enthusiasm about 
the freedoms to be gained gave way to a more 
sober assessment - that the process had value 
in itself as it involved deep and fundamental 
restructuring of the security institutions and 
agencies, and thus made a crucial contribution 
to greater transparency of the state. In other 
words, regardless of the ultimate benefit of 
granting freedom to travel, the citizens of 
Eastern Partnership states are going to see the 
security sector open up, resulting in improved 
treatment of their own citizens. 
From this point of view, a shift of emphasis 
from meeting a series of strictly technical 
requirements to achieving qualitative change in 
the operation of security institutions (including 
greater attention paid to civic and human rights) 
may actually be welcomed by civil society in the 
Eastern Partnership states. Incidentally, raising 
the bar in the negotiations and monitoring of 
implementation of action plans for visa-free 
movement realises one of the priorities of the 
Partnership initiative - genuine progress in the 
area of rule of law and human rights.
Experts in Eastern Partnership states have long 
postulated reforms of Ministries of Interior, 
turning them into civilian institutions with 
capacity for strategic planning and oversight of 
operational agencies. Diligent implementation 
of these reforms will be a signal for the public 
in these states of the genuine commitment of 
the governments to civil and human rights 
and European integration, confirming their 
credentials as reformers. CSOs have a crucial 
role in alerting the governments in their states of 
the extent of reforms that need to be undertaken, 
and in pointing out how such reforms could 
raise the trust of the public in the government.
Further down the road, implementation reports 
can be used as opportunities for pointing 
out the outstanding problems and forging 
a common understanding on what needs to 
be done. The feedback from the European 
Commission suggests that the governments of the 
Eastern Partnership states need to incorporate 
into their national action plans recommendations 
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from international organisations, and comply 
with commitments made (especially in the fields 
of anti-corruption or anti-discrimination).
Member-states supportive of the process 
are already becoming aware of the need to 
address head-on the concerns of skeptical EU 
governments, especially Ministries of Interior. 
Their own recent experience in implementation 
of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) acquis 
communautaire, and preparations for entry 
into Schengen, demonstrated the need to give 
experts from the skeptical member-states 
ample opportunity to visit the facilities, and 
to place liaison officers at institutions. The 
Polish EU Council Presidency is not likely to 
push premature acceleration of the process, but 
is going on the one hand to complete the first 
phase with a leader (perhaps Moldova), give 
clear indication of the homework to be done 
by Ukraine in order to close the first stage, and 
open negotiations on visa facilitation with other 
Eastern Partnership states.
At the same time, Poland and other supporters 
will face a difficult task in raising the issue of 
specific internal policymaking challenges, 
faced especially by Ukraine, pointing to the 
need for offering mid-term incentives and 
coming up with strategies for overcoming 
deadlock in talks with Ukraine. Poland was 
the last country to close the JHA chapter in 
accession negotiations, and is aware that the 
technical process must be complemented by 
political dialogue.
This brings us to the fundamental question: is 
the presentation of the facts on the progress 
of individual countries sufficient to overcome 
the fundamental concerns of countries like the 
Netherlands, Belgium, or France? The lesson 
from the recent crisis following the lifting of 
visas with some Western Balkans countries is 
that domestic preoccupation with the burden 
of immigrants on the asylum and social security 
system will not be assuaged by showing 
technical progress on individual elements of the 
plan;  but that it is necessary to demonstrate 
the willingness of the governments of the 
Eastern Partnership states to acknowledge 
existing problems, and provide evidence to 
show that the situation inside the countries 
is improving to provide sufficient deterrence 
to abuse of the visa regime by the Eastern 
Partner countries’ own citizens.
the nutS and boltS oF the 
proceSS
Visa liberalisation between the EU and the 
countries of the Eastern Partnership is subject to 
constraints, which may be divided into two main 
categories: related to the process itself (and 
consisting of technical and political aspects) 
and reflecting the interests and positions of key 
stakeholders, often going beyond the question 
of the visa regime or relations with Eastern 
Partnership states.
a. technical
The format of the Eastern Partnership has 
provided an opportunity for the six countries 
covered by the initiative to enter a process of 
genuine approximation of legal and institutional 
frameworks with the acquis communautaire, 
and as a result align their administrative 
structures and processes with those found in 
the EU. Within this process, visa facilitation 
and liberalisation, which were once only in 
the realm of postulates, are being gradually 
achieved through a technical process, based 
on jointly agreed and measurable progress 
indicators.
This shift from a principle-based discourse to a 
technical exercise has profound implications for 
all the stakeholders in the process. As EU member-
states have given the European Commission a 
mandate for initiating and conducting talks with 
the EU’s neighbours, they have also expressed 
basic trust in the Commission’s ability to monitor 
the progress toward the required standards, 
abstaining from intervention throughout the 
process except at certain, specified stages. 
As a sole representative of the EU in the exercise, 
the European Commission is committed to its 
successful completion, deploying all measures 
necessary to ensuring that by the end of the 
exercise the relevant EU legal norms and 
standards are in place. In turn, upon entering 
the approximation process, the governments 
of the Eastern Partnership states have put to 
the test their capacity for undertaking clear 
commitments, covering a range of issues vital 
to national security, good governance, and 
human rights.
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In this context, it is also important to draw a 
distinction between the format of the visa 
liberalisation process and that employed for 
negotiating readmission and visa facilitation. 
Unlike the latter, this one is not strictly a 
technical exercise whose outcome is certain. 
Its scope is far more comprehensive - requiring 
fundamental realignment of state services and 
reforms covering the entire justice and home 
affairs sector. In general, the division of the 
process into two stages, review of existing 
legislative base and institutional framework, 
and verification of the ability of the country 
to pull these resources together to achieve 
a qualitatively different outcome, hints at a 
fundamental issue: the institutions as we know 
them now in the Partnership states are not up for 
the task, and mere reallocation of resources will 
not meet the requirements.
Fulfilment of the technical criteria in the first 
phase of the visa liberalisation process is vital 
not only to demonstrate the capacity for border 
and migration control, but also to show that 
there is a will to carry out fundamental reforms 
of the legal and institutional framework. From 
this point of view, the European Commission 
reports, such as those published on the progress 
of Moldova and Ukraine in September 2011, 
are watched closely by the skeptics who are 
quick to point out delays, unmet promises and 
stalemates, and interpret them as a lack of will 
to reform. 
When seen from this perspective, the gaps 
overshadow undisputed areas of progress (such 
as improved border management, conclusion 
of readmission agreements, preparation of the 
action plan for national migration management 
strategy, presence of legal framework in the 
area of public order and security). However, 
those clear gaps are not only symptomatic of 
the actual barriers to reform, but are at the same 
time points of particular interest for many EU 
member-states. 
The Commission thus found issues in such sensitive 
areas as the adoption of anti-discrimination 
legislation (in both countries as of the time of 
preparation of reports), establishment of an 
anti-corruption agency (Ukraine), and progress 
in carrying out GRECO recommendations on 
tackling corruption (in both states), the need 
to align the asylum system with EU standards 
(Ukraine), and to establish a mechanism for 
monitoring migration flows (Ukraine).
b. political
At the same time, the road to visa-free movement 
goes beyond meeting narrowly understood 
technical criteria, and cannot be separated 
from the broader political climate around the 
issue. As observed in the cases of Western 
Balkans states and Romania and Bulgaria, 
when taking the ultimate decision on certifying 
the candidates as ready, the EU member-states 
considered issues other than those found on the 
original scorecard. In fact, when compared with 
earlier exercises of this type, progress towards 
visa liberalisation for Eastern Partnership states 
is likely to be even more vulnerable to the 
changing political climate.
In contrast to the above-mentioned exercises, 
this process is not anchored in the clear and 
foreseeable political perspective of EU and 
Schengen membership. In fact, its outcome is 
far from certain, and no guarantees may be 
given. Probably for the first time, deep reforms 
will have to be carried out not with the benefits 
in mind to the home population, but in order 
to prove to the EU member-states that the state 
apparatus in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia 
is willing and able to reduce the threats 
associated with illegal migration, as perceived 
by the public inside the EU. 
This means that certain assumptions no longer 
hold true: firstly, unlike in the case of citizens 
of Central European and Western Balkan 
states, the right of citizens of Eastern Partnership 
states to free movement within the EU is not 
explicitly stated - for the simple reason that 
visa liberalisation is not part of an accession 
perspective. Secondly, it is worth noting that 
the lack of political commitment of many EU 
member-states to the integration of Ukraine 
and other states of the Partnership de facto 
puts the brakes on any possible attempt by 
the Commission or some enthusiastic member-
states to accelerate the process by reference to 
the right of the eastern neighbours to mobility 
within the EU (impact assessment). Without 
the foundation in the fundamental rights and 
freedoms, the process is likely to be influenced 
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the area of free movement, it is vital to tackle 
the relevance of these arguments in the context 
of the process of visa liberalisation between the 
EU and some states of the Eastern Partnership.
a. national preoccupations with 
migration 
It is worth emphasizing that the Eastern 
Partnership is a relatively new initiative, 
launched in 2009, which is only making 
its way into the awareness of the European 
public, especially in the “old” states of the EU. 
This is clear when we consider that in the last 
comprehensive review of media references to 
the issues of further enlargement and European 
Neighbourhood Policy carried out by EU-27 
initiative in July 2010, the Eastern Partnership 
received minimal attention in countries such as 
Belgium, the Netherlands, France, or Spain. A 
preliminary survey of the debates in these states 
this year shows little change, which may be 
easily explained by the following:
• diversion of attention to turmoil in the 
Mediterranean basin, which gave the states 
that always had been more interested in the 
transfer of resources and attention to the South 
at the expense of the East;
• preoccupation with integration of the Western 
Balkans and unfinished business concerning full 
entry of Romania and Bulgaria into Schengen. 
Both of these processes were supposed to be 
relatively trouble-free, and were not expected 
to draw the attention of member-states. In fact, 
they touched issues that already preoccupied 
the public in several member-states (abuse of 
asylum systems, threat of uncontrolled migration, 
vulnerability of migration systems to the activities 
of organised crime).
The first issue surfaced when five Southern EU 
countries made a diplomatic offensive, issuing 
a letter to the EU High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine 
Ashton, dated 16 February 2011, and signed 
by the foreign ministers of France, Spain, 
Cyprus, Greece, Malta and Slovenia. The 
letter stated: “The profound popular movements 
calling for political, economic and social 
reforms in Tunisia and Egypt argue in favour 
of reinforcing the European Union’s actions in 
its Southern neighbourhood.” In the attached 
by other, pressing points of the agenda of EU 
member-states - concern over their own ability to 
integrate migrants, combating organised crime 
and transborder criminality.
Unfortunately, the reverse also holds true. The 
broader context of domestic policy in certain 
Eastern Partnership states may potentially stall 
the progress of talks toward visa liberalisation. 
An example is the court case against Yulia 
Tymoshenko, which was criticised as an 
example of politically motivated “selective 
justice” by EU leaders. While the decision of 
the Kyiv court to detain the opposition leader 
did not have immediate effects on the process 
of review of Ukraine’s capacity for visa-free 
movement in the EU, it certainly cast doubt 
on the country’s commitment to a set of values 
cherished by the EU and its member-states. 
This point was underscored by European 
Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso 
who in his comment on the verdict, made on 
10 October 2011, on the one hand stressed 
the importance of “a reinforced relationship 
with Ukraine” but on the other hand stated that 
the EU expects “Ukraine to uphold the values 
of rule of law, of human rights, of fundamental 
rights and of course an independent judiciary”. 
opponentS: who are they, and 
what are their argumentS?
A group of EU member-states can be expected 
to resist quick conclusion of the negotiations 
on visa liberalisation with Eastern Partnership 
countries. The opposition is likely to be well-
entrenched, concentrating on issues already 
high on national agendas. The strength of 
the opposition can be expected to be more 
sustained than the resistance against the full 
entry into the Schengen zone of Romania 
and Bulgaria in December 2010 and then in 
October 2011 - a resistance that demonstrates 
the continuing sentiment against the extension 
of greater freedom of travel. 
Notwithstanding the demonstrable progress 
on technical criteria in some of the Eastern 
Partnership countries, fundamental points of 
resistance will persist. Since the opponents tend 
to raise the points made earlier with regard to 
the integration of south-east European states into 
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co-operation on migration management and 
control of illegal movement that the EU’s Eastern 
neighbours have made in collaboration with the 
EU. It is widely acknowledged that the Eastern 
border of the EU has been a significant barrier 
to illegal migration, whose scale was already 
a much lower degree of magnitude than the 
pressure recorded in the Mediterranean. 
Improvement in border controls has taken place 
in all new EU member-states on their way 
towards accession and later integration into the 
Schengen area. The EU’s Eastern neighbours, 
in turn, have accepted an ever greater 
responsibility for ensuring that their territory is not 
used for illegal transit. This process culminated 
in the conclusion and successful implementation 
of readmission agreements with the EU by 
three Eastern Partnership countries (Georgia, 
Moldova, Ukraine).
There is another reason for believing that visa-free 
travel with the states of the Eastern Partnership 
will not result in a significant increase of illegal 
movement. The migrants from the largest 
Partnership state, Ukraine, who had found their 
way to Southern Europe, took advantage of the 
regularisation schemes, and the small-border 
traffic schemes targeting western Ukrainian 
regions have also helped bring the substantial 
trans-frontier movement under control. The large 
interest of this category of migrants in seeking 
ways to legalise their status suggests that they 
may be expected to abide by the terms of the 
visa-free regime.
b. “irreversible” reforms and 
“impact” on migration patterns
Another line of division concerns the contents 
of the process of negotiations with Eastern 
Partners, separating the countries having and 
lacking external Schengen borders. It coincides 
with the division observed already in the cases 
of the lifting of visas for Albania and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and the entry into Schengen 
of Romania and Bulgaria. Thus, Germany, 
Austria, the Netherlands, and France tend to 
stress the need to ensure that the progress is 
“irreversible” and that the “impact” of migration 
on EU member-states is taken into account when 
making the final decision. 
analysis, the southerners argued that the Eastern 
neighbours had received disproportionately 
higher per-capita allocations than the southern 
counterparts, thus calling in fact for lowering the 
priority of activities assisting the East. Poland, 
Sweden, Romania, Hungary or the Baltic 
states view this differently, pointing to rough 
equality in absolute numbers. However, it is 
indisputable that the plans of the Hungarian 
and Polish Presidencies to push for progress 
with the Eastern Partners had to be modified, 
and a new consensus was required to balance 
the two directions.
These two issues (the stability of the Southern 
neighbourhood and concern over migration-
related security) represent two axes along which 
potential opposition rests to the liberalisation of 
visas with the Eastern neighbours. There is an 
overlap between these two discourses as, for 
instance, in France the preoccupation with the 
stability in the South coincides with concern over 
the threats posed by uncontrolled migration. 
France’s position is pivotal here as French 
diplomacy was widely seen as the initiator of 
the Southern coalition, and the proposal called 
for resurrecting the Union for the Mediterranean, 
earlier advocated by French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy. It was for instance acknowledged in 
the recent talks between Sarkozy and Polish 
prime minister Donald Tusk that the support 
of France was essential for maintaining the 
momentum of the Eastern Partnership. 
At the same time, France has remained at 
the forefront of efforts to strengthen migration 
controls both within the Schengen area and 
on its external frontiers. This is clear from the 
statements made by the French European Affairs 
Minister Laurent Wauquiez, who justified his 
government’s opposition to the early accession 
of Romania and Bulgaria into Schengen in a 
speech to the parliament citing that it would 
amount to “weakening of our borders and the 
capacity of Europe to manage and control its 
flow of migrants” (8 December 2010). In late 
April 2011, Wauqiez argued for the right to 
reintroduce border checks on national borders 
in case of a “major surge at Europe’s gates”.
These wider concerns may be countered firstly by 
highlighting the crucial differences between the 
migratory pressures on the Southern and Eastern 
flank of the EU, and secondly the progress in 
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framework of EU values, and attempted to justify 
it by arguing that it would actually facilitate 
the prospects of expansion of the area of free 
movement and the extension of the visa-free 
regime to Europe’s neighbours. For instance, 
in May 2011 German Interior Minister Hans-
Peter Friedrich argued that if the member-states 
could “restore controls… countries which are on 
the way to accession will find it easier to be 
accepted in this Schengen space”.
Similar sentiment was expressed with regard 
to the process of visa liberalisation with the 
Western Balkans, and was stated by an 
interviewed representative of an EU member-
state skeptical towards the fast negotiation 
style as the reason why the Netherlands, 
backed by Belgium and France, pushed for 
the introduction of an “impact assessment” 
and on-the-ground missions comprising experts 
from EU member-states. The Commission has 
responded by addressing these concerns, and 
accepting a two-stage process of verification, 
concentrating in the European Neighbourhood 
Policy communiqué on vital shortcomings from 
the perspective of member-states (asylum law 
in Ukraine, anti-discrimination law in Moldova, 
asylum cases from Georgia).
However, these parallels are of limited use 
when discussing the visa liberalisation process 
with the Eastern Partners. Firstly, as already 
noted above, unlike in the case of the Western 
Balkans, Romania and Bulgaria, the progress 
towards visa-free movement is not for the time 
being tied to the prospects of EU accession. 
Thus, it cannot be argued that any of the states 
is being treated on grounds other than the 
strict technical criteria. If any parallel could be 
drawn, it would be one with Central European 
states, which were granted visa-free movement 
with the Schengen states far in advance, and 
independently, of accession to the EU. Indeed, 
the experience of Central European states in 
the 1990s shows that the solid progress they 
made on ensuring border security, improving 
migration management and co-operating with 
the EU on these matters gradually equipped 
them to undertake further obligations in the 
course of harmonisation with the EU.
Secondly, the Eastern Partnership is not 
viewed by the individual partner countries as 
a platform for lobbying for access to visa-free 
These states:
• are willing to extend the scope of the 
verification to include broader aspects of justice 
and migration management;
• favour more extensive and repeated “on-the-
ground” missions; and 
• reserve the right to judge the progress outside 
the scope of the Commission’s criteria. 
As part of this research, it was established that 
these EU member-states became critical over 
time of the format of negotiations with Romania 
and Bulgaria first into the EU and then into 
Schengen. As one press report put it, diplomats 
from those states “complained that security 
concerns were swept under the rug”, and chose 
the time at which the decision was taken on the 
candidacy of the two South-East European states 
for Schengen integration in December 2010 
to make their discontent heard. The conviction 
that the strictly technical approach did not take 
into account other factors relevant for assessing 
state capacity led them to the conclusion that 
a change in the format of negotiations was 
necessary. 
Citing in particular criticisms of the judiciary 
and about corruption, the German Minister 
of Interior, Thomas de Maiziere, stated that it 
was “premature” for Romania and Bulgaria to 
join Schengen as “it is important to link the two 
issues—the technical aspects and the political 
aspects—and make a decision taking both 
into consideration” (statement made in January 
2011).
The Netherlands reiterated this position in May 
2011 when its European Affairs Minister, Ben 
Knappen, declared that the Hague would object 
to the integration of Romania into the Schengen 
area as long as it was not “convinced that we 
are on a track that guarantees sustainable, 
irreversible and lasting progress” in the 
field of Justice and Home Affairs. Even more 
significantly, the minister dismissed the findings 
of the Commission periodic report confirming 
technical progress, stating that “it is hard to 
imagine that on the basis of one report you can 
talk about irreversible and sustainable progress” 
in the sector.
It is notable that both Germany and the 
Netherlands found it imperative to frame the 
initiative to reintroduce border controls in the 
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movement on a group basis. Instead, it has 
served as a stimulus for competition among the 
states to adopt technical standards and move 
to higher levels of co-operation with the EU. 
The Partnership formula is proving useful for 
generating interest in some sort of facilitation 
of movement in all the states covered by the 
initiative, and also by proclaiming freedom of 
travel as one of its core values. At the same 
time, the model of quasi-roadmaps, providing 
clear benchmarks and dividing the process 
into stages, is an incentive for progress for 
individual states, and in principle is open to 
faster progress.
SupporterS: who are they, and 
what are their argumentS?
The group of supporters is far less recognisable, 
and it does not appear as consolidated as 
that of the opponents. These characteristics 
are not surprising when the qualities of the 
states making up the group are considered. 
The position favouring fast conclusion of visa-
free agreements with countries of the Eastern 
Partnership is based on two main arguments:
• Unencumbered access to EU territory for 
citizens of Eastern Partnership states is a way 
of promoting people-to-people contacts and 
a pro-democracy instrument. This rationale 
underlies the Eastern Partnership’s objective 
of promoting freedom of movement, and has 
been raised by countries lying along the Eastern 
border of the EU - in particular, Poland, Lithuania, 
Hungary, and Romania. It has received support 
from countries standing behind or sympathetic 
towards the Eastern Partnership initiative, 
such as Sweden and the Czech Republic. 
Occasionally, this idea was also voiced in the 
statements of the German Foreign Ministry.
• An additional argument, frequently raised by 
civil society organisations both within Eastern 
Partnership states and their EU counterparts and 
partners, views the lifting of visa requirements 
as a way to end corruption and demeaning 
practices associated with the process of 
application and issuance of visas. Moreover, 
contrary to the view circulated by Ministries 
of Interior of the “skeptical” states, they argue 
that restrictive visa regimes are far from being 
an effective instrument to combat organised 
crime and illegal migration and instead are 
liable to abuse, incurring high costs on bona 
fide travellers. This view was in fact vindicated 
by the problems faced by consulates of EU 
member-states in the Eastern Partnership states 
in combating abusive practices through which 
third-party agents would establish corrupt 
networks, raising the real cost of visas for the 
applicants.
• Finally, the “new” states of the European 
Union, which have been the last to negotiate 
their accession to the Schengen area, tend to 
stress that the countries of the Eastern Partnership 
ought to be assessed against a closed list of 
measurable indicators. They are aware of 
their own experience (e.g. Romania’s delayed 
Schengen entry), and maintain that the list of 
requirements ought not to be expanded at further 
stages of the assessment. Furthermore, they are 
opposed to adopting a “regional approach”, 
in which the successful performers may still be 
held back if they fail to demonstrate that their 
entry into the visa-free regime does not increase 
the pressure of illegal migration in the region. 
Instead, they argue that each candidate ought 
to be assessed on its own merits - this would, for 
instance, allow the frontrunners to clear hurdles 
faster than others.
However, support for visa liberalisation is 
tenuous in this group for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the countries in this group are relative 
newcomers to the EU who have not had as 
much experience in building effective coalitions 
on behalf of common causes. Secondly, despite 
Poland’s limited successes in launching initiatives 
such as the Eastern Partnership, Warsaw has 
not managed yet to establish a permanent 
coalition and, while holding its Presidency 
of the Council, it has been preoccupied with 
other pressing European issues. In addition, 
some countries are on the fence with regard 
to the balance between mobility with Eastern 
Partnership states and security concerns related 
to increased migration. One case could 
be the Czech Republic, which has recently 
become alarmed at the problem of corruption 
surrounding visa administration in Ukraine.
Moreover, the advocates of visa liberalisation 
are going to find their task much harder as the 
process goes beyond clearly technical criteria 
(where they may call for fair assessment and act 
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as watchdogs for the Commission’s work) and 
tackles broader issues of effective governance 
and adherence to shared values. For Sweden, 
Poland or Germany, the Eastern Partners’ 
compliance with human rights standards and 
consolidation of democratic institutions and 
processes remains a central consideration in 
their foreign policy objectives with regard to 
this region. Such a position is shared by other 
members of the support camp, such as the 
Baltic or other Visegrad states. 
Whenever the conduct of the governments of the 
Eastern Partnership states is in violation of these 
standards, the supporters are bound to raise he 
alarm and are unlikely to opt for advancing the 
negotiations toward visa liberalisation or other 
integration objectives at the expense of these 
core values. This was demonstrated in October 
2011 when, in reaction to the Tymoshenko case, 
Sweden’s Foreign Minister Carl Bildt warned 
that the court verdict could “endanger the entire 
relationship” with Ukraine, while the head of 
Poland’s diplomacy, Radosław Sikorski, noted 
that it could “derail” the progress of EU-Ukraine 
talks on association and other agreements. 
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Visa policies were brought within the (then) 
European Community framework with the 
Maastricht Treaty, concretely the determination 
of the third countries whose nationals must 
be in possession of visas when crossing the 
external borders of the member-states, and 
the establishment of a standard model visa. 
The Amsterdam Treaty (1997) then broke new 
ground with an expansion of the EU’s visa 
policy. It was pooled in the newly introduced 
Title IV “Visas, Asylum, Immigration and other 
Policies related to free movements of persons”, 
and brought under the legal framework of the 
Community. In addition, the Schengen acquis 
communautaire was annexed to the treaty, so 
that harmonisation measures regarding visas 
agreed by the Schengen members outside the 
Community now became part of the EU’s legal 
framework.
Taking into consideration the wide range 
of issues relevant for the visa liberalisation 
dialogue and the need to establish an 
adequately secured context for visa-free travel, 
the objective of an Action Plan (a Questionnaire 
or a Roadmap) is to set up clear requirements 
and identify all the measures that need to be 
adopted and implemented by the three Eastern 
Partnership countries in the near future. 
The EU member-states and the three countries 
of the Eastern Partnership share a mutual 
interest in the success of the action plans on 
visa liberalisation and the accompanying 
requirements in facilitating the removal of 
Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine from the EU 
Visa Negative List and in putting them on track 
for future EU membership.
Part II by Nadya Dimitrova 
Successive EU enlargements have brought 
the six Eastern Partnership countries (Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and 
Ukraine) closer to the European Union, and their 
security, stability and prosperity increasingly 
impact on the EU member-states. All these 
countries, to varying degrees, are carrying out 
political, social and economic reforms, and 
have stated their wish to come closer to the EU. 
The EU encourages the active engagement 
of the partner countries and their commitment 
to shared values and principles, including 
democracy, the rule of law, the respect for 
human rights and good governance. All 
these principles are essential and will lead to 
negotiations for, and successful implementation 
of, future Association Agreements.
The Eastern Partnership initiative plays the role 
of a catalyst of transformation processes and 
provides an opportunity for the partner countries 
to integrate with the EU by developing stable 
democratic structures and enabling stronger 
participation of civil society. It can facilitate 
the de-Sovietisation of some of the countries, 
and stimulate nation-building, finalising the 
process of building national identity and self-
respect in their respective societies. 
The Eastern Partnership initiative and 
multilateral co-operation are to be based 
on the implementation of concrete projects. 
Co-operation on migration issues, border 
management, the fight against illegal 
migration, organised crime and corruption 
would open up with the possibility for the EU 
to introduce an easier visa-facilitating process 
and a visa-free regime in the future. 
This paper focuses on recommendations 
regarding the progress in the above areas by 
three of the Eastern Partnership countries, “the 
frontrunners”: Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine 
in the context of the future visa liberalisation of 
the three countries’ relations with the EU.
action plan benchmarks can support rule 
of law in ukraine, moldova, and georgia
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recommendationS to georgia, 
moldova, and ukraine:
 
• Ensure effective implementation of the 
Community Readmission Agreements;
• Provision of secure identity documents: 
issuance of biometric passports in compliance 
with ICAO and EU standards with a clear 
timeframe for phasing out the old documents;
• Adoption and efficient implementation of the 
Integrated Border Management (IBM) strategy;
• Enhanced co-operation with FRONTEX;
• Establishment of a mechanism for the 
monitoring of migration flows and a regularly 
updated migration profile;
• Implementation of legislation, strategies 
and action plans for fighting organised 
crime, in particular cross-border aspects such 
as combating trafficking in human beings; 
combating money laundering and the financing 
of terrorism; national counter-drug strategies; 
prevention of, and fight against, corruption;
• Implementation of international conventions 
concerning judicial co-operation in criminal 
matters (in particular Council of Europe 
Conventions), application of measures aimed at 
improving the efficiency of judicial co-operation 
in criminal matters  with the EU member states and 
with countries in the region, and development of 
working relations with Eurojust (the EU’s agency 
to co-ordinate judicial action to combat serious 
cross-border and organised crime;
• Adoption and implementation of data 
protection legislation. 
recommendationS to the 
european commiSSion, and 
to the poliSh and daniSh eu 
council preSidencieS:
 
• The EU should ensure better implementation 
of the Visa Facilitation Agreements, and open 
Common Visa Application centres in countries 
where Schengen Member States do not have 
consulates (e.g. Georgia);
• Based on the implementation of the Action 
Plans’ benchmarks, the EU should gradually 
move towards visa liberalisation, provided 
that all the relevant conditions are fully met;
• Based on the readiness of Georgia to continue 
reforms in key areas, it is recommended that the 
country be offered a Visa Liberalisation Action 
Plan during the Polish Presidency;
• The EU should guarantee that visa 
liberalisation can be used as a strong incentive 
to promote democratisation and human rights 
reforms in the three countries;
• Provided most of the reforms are implemented, 
the EU should take concrete steps towards 
political association and economic integration 
of the respective country;
• The EU should continue to be engaged in the 
management/settlement of security issues in the 
Eastern Partnership countries (e.g. EUBAM in 
Moldova and EUMM in Georgia);
• The EU should further support and 
encourage the Eastern Partnership Civil 
Society Forum to be involved in official platform 
meetings and thematic working groups of the 
Eastern Partnership;
• More funding should be provided through, 
and better use should be made of, the European 
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and 
the new Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility 
in order to strengthen civil society’s capacity to 
promote human rights and democratic reform.
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action planS For viSa 
liberaliSation - toolS For 
SeriouS reFormS
The  Action Plans for Ukraine  and Moldova 
obtaining a visa-free regime are structured in 
two layers of benchmarks - “two phases”: 
• preliminary benchmarks - covering the policy 
framework (legislation and planning);
• specific benchmarks - covering effective 
and sustainable implementation of relevant 
measures, including concrete results on the 
ground.
The Action Plans follow a balanced approach, 
setting benchmarks with clear requirements for 
the reforms to be implemented in the same key 
areas as with the visa liberalisation roadmaps 
used for the Western Balkan states, i.e.
• security of documents 
• border management 
• fight against illegal migration
• fight against organised crime and corruption
• fundamental rights.
However, the monitoring of the implementation 
of the Action Plans will be slightly different. 
The European Commission will regularly report 
to the European Parliament and to the EU 
Council on the countries’ implementation of the 
first set of benchmarks from the Action Plans. 
The Commission will also assess possible 
impacts in terms of migration and security 
for the countries’ citizens (at the moment from 
Moldova and Ukraine) travelling to the EU. 
Based on the results, a decision will be taken by 
the Commission and the Council to initiate the 
assessment of the second phase of benchmarks. 
The implementation of the benchmarks will 
also be assessed through on-site evaluations 
by experts from the EU member-states and 
through detailed information (including relevant 
statistical data) provided by the respective 
Eastern Partnership countries. The information 
should include concrete results on the ground. 
Then, on the basis of the fulfilment of all the 
benchmarks, the Commission will make a 
proposal to the European Parliament and to 
the Council for the lifting of the short-stay visa 
obligation for the citizens of the country through 
an amendment of Regulation 539/2001, i.e. 
listing the third countries whose nationals must 
be in possession of visas when crossing the 
external borders of the EU and those whose 
nationals are exempt from that requirement.
The visa liberalisation Action Plans for the three 
Eastern Partnership countries and the roadmaps 
for the Western Balkans countries do not differ 
fundamentally in the criteria set out, but in 
the way they are staged and monitored. The 
difference also comes from the more important 
role of the European Parliament for the Eastern 
Partnership countries - which is linked to the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
In the case of the Eastern Partnership 
countries, there are several additional stages 
and constraints before the decision of visa 
liberalisation will be taken.
what haS been done So Far by 
the three countrieS in the key 
areaS?
DocUMEnt SEcUrIty
moldova
The issuance of Moldovan identity documents 
is regulated by the Law No.273-NIII on Identity 
Documents of the National Passport System and 
on other legislative acts.
Moldova was the first of the Eastern Partnership 
countries to start issuing biometric passports. 
The country has also centralised the system of 
documents personalisation based on the State 
Register of Population, accessible on-line through 
a secured network. This State Register also 
deals with the civil registry. Biometric passports 
are issued by the Ministry of Information and 
Technology.
However, so far only a small amount of 
biometric passports have been issued. The 
phasing out of the current, old passports Is 
foreseen for 2019. It is recommended that 
Moldovan authorities speed up the process 
of the replacement of the passports with the 
new biometric ones. 
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the personalisation, storage of documents and 
their delivery.
Ukraine is not yet issuing biometric passports. 
A regulation determining the sample of biometric 
passport has not been adopted yet. 
There are three types of passport in parallel use 
in Ukraine now:
Polycarbonate page passports - issued 
since June 2007, International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO)-compliant (not biometric), 
machine-readable passports containing 
sufficient quality polycarbonate page with 
personal data (blue colour passports).
Passports with the attached photo - the 
oldest type of passport, introduced in 1994, 
containing an attached photo and machine-
readable line (red colour passports); a lot of 
them are still in use. Although their issuance 
officially stopped in 2007, some passports of 
this type were issued for the diplomatic missions 
abroad in 2010; their validity is for 10 years.
Passports with integrated photo (red colour 
passport) - introduced in 2000, and look like 
the previous ones; the only difference is the 
integrated digital photo instead of the attached 
one in the previous version. 
The existence of three types of passports is 
not compatible with the visa liberalisation 
requirements. The government needs urgently 
to elaborate a schedule for phasing out of 
documents that do not meet ICAO standards.
Even more serious is the case with the so-
called “domestic” passports, children’s travel 
document, and driving licences (there are 
seven different types of driving licences valid 
simultaneously). All of them are old types of 
documents - examples of the Soviet legacy in 
urgent need of replacement.
Hence, in the area of document security, 
Ukraine has made very limited progress. Most 
of the identity documents are outdated and 
with low technical standards. The whole area 
is characterised by a lack of transparency, 
unhealthy competition between different 
institutions and unaccountable corporate 
The EU member-states’ missions, assessing the 
implementation of the first set of benchmarks 
and the readiness of Moldova to start the 
operational phase, raised two concerns in the 
area of document security e.g.
• the chip containing the biometric data is not 
integrated but attached;
• a page for children is kept in the parent’s 
passport instead of a separate passport.
It should be mentioned that an ethical code has 
been adopted for employees working in the 
system of identity document issuance. Special 
measures to prevent corruption have been taken 
like:
• closed circuit television cameras were 
installed
• payments for documents are made through 
ATM machines directly connected to the State 
Register
• a hotline has been introduced for reporting 
corruption cases.
Transnistria, however, remains a big challenge 
for the Moldovan authorities. Efforts have been 
made to put an end to the falsified and insecure 
breeder documents issued in this region. A new 
mechanism is being prepared.
ukraine
Although the National Plan for the implementation 
of the Action Plan for Visa Liberalisation states 
that the Law on Identity Documents should be 
developed and submitted to the Parliament in 
the first half of 2011, it is still not a fact and 
Ukraine does not have relevant legislation. All 
the issues connected to the identity documents 
are set by government regulations. There is a 
lack of sufficient legislation ensuring proper 
control over personalisation and the storage of 
documents. 
Everything is  determined by the Cabinet of 
Ministers’ regulations - which do not fully observe 
the EU standards on the integrity and security of 
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business interests. The recently adopted 
National Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation 
(22 April 2011) shows some understanding 
on behalf of the government of the need for 
measures to be taken in this field.
georgia
The institution in charge of the provision for all 
identity and breeder documents for citizens and 
other nationals in Georgia is the Civil Registry 
Agency - an official structure under the Ministry 
of Justice.
The Agency started issuing biometric passports 
on 14 April 2010. Since January 2011, the 
Civil Registry Agency has been responsible 
for issuing only biometric passports, and 
for developing a unified database system. 
According to official sources, all information 
written on microchips is safe and the passports’ 
quality satisfies ICAO standards. The Civil 
Registry Agency is also starting the issuance of 
electronic ID cards.
However, it is allowed for one and the same 
person to have several passports. The fact 
that there is no restriction barring citizens 
from holding more than one passport should 
be a matter of serious criticism. This practice 
does not correspond with the EU standards 
for document security.
Another issue of concern is the underdeveloped 
legislation that regulates the main activities of 
the Civil Registry Agency. At the moment, the 
main law for the functioning of the Agency 
i.e. “On Identification Document and Passport 
of Citizenship for Georgian Citizens and 
Registration of Foreigners Residing in Georgia” 
was first adopted in 1996. Since then, 
numerous amendments have been made that 
make the provisions of the law very difficult to 
be applied.
Therefore, a main priority for the well 
functioning of the Agency is the adoption of 
new laws on:
• The Citizens’ Register
• Registration of Civil Acts
• Identity Documents
• Personal data Protection
IllEgAl MIgrAtIon
Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements 
have been concluded first with Moldova and 
Ukraine, and later with Georgia.
Readmission Agreements should be regarded 
as an instrument for the authorities to better 
cope with illegal migration and address third-
country nationals and stateless persons in a 
proper manner.
moldova
The Integrated Border Strategy, adopted on 27 
December 2010, is in accordance with the 
recommendations and assistance of EUBAM 
(European Union Border Assistance Mission). In 
addition to the Strategy on 3 May 2011, an 
Action Plan based on the Schengen Catalogue 
was also adopted. The new law on the State 
Border is being drafted and publicly debated 
at the moment. The Border Guard Service is 
expected to have a long-term development 
vision.
The Integrated Border Management system 
is considered difficult to be achieved at the 
moment due to the considerable efforts and 
funds that are needed. 
The Border Service is still not fully professionalised 
without a General Director for several months 
and without the necessary equipment. Debates 
are continuing as to whether it should continue 
to be under the still unreformed Ministry of 
Interior.
The challenging and problematic part of 
Moldova’s border is the perimeter of Transnistria, 
a territory de facto outside the control of 
Moldovan constitutional authorities. EUBAM, 
established in 2006, aims to counter the 
smuggling of goods and to assist in enhancing 
co-operation with Ukraine for more efficient 
border control.
The demarcation of the Ukraine-Moldova state 
borders has not yet been finalised in some 
locations neighbouring Ukraine and at the 
Transnistrian perimeter. 
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As a whole, the illegal migration and border 
management block is still far from reaching the 
EU standards although a lot of resources are 
invested in the area.
ukraine
The State Border Service of Ukraine (SBS) is 
an independent agency, the head of which 
is subordinated to the President of Ukraine. 
The State Border Guard Service of Ukraine 
is a national successor of the Soviet Union 
Border Troops, first organised in 1991 as the 
“Ukrainian Border Troops”.
For the past ten years, steps have been taken 
in order to transform the SBS into an EU-style 
civil border protection unit. However, it remains 
under-reformed. Although since 2006 the 
personnel have been recruited on a professional 
basis, internal relations and the management 
are still regulated by military statutes and some 
substantial features of the military structure are 
preserved.
All the adopted documents aiming at the 
introduction of Integrated Border Management 
recommend ultimate demilitarisation and 
other relevant reforms. Several pieces of 
legislation regulating the work of the state border 
system of Ukraine have been an important step, 
but not sufficient.
On 27 October 2010, a Strategy for Integrated 
Border Management for the period 2011-2015 
was adopted according to EU standards.
While Ukraine and Moldova are getting closer 
to finalisation of demarcation of the borders 
between the two countries, demarcation of the 
borders with Russia and Belarus have not yet 
started and the process will take several years. 
The issue of the sea border in the Kerch Strait 
remains unresolved.
There are several laws that regulate the 
migration policy of Ukraine. However, most of 
them - including the two important in this area, 
Law on Foreigners and Law on Refugees, still 
need amendments according to the EU criteria. 
Similarly, Ukraine does not have relevant 
legislation on asylum seekers. 
Moldova has an institutionalised relationship 
with Frontex, the EU agency established to 
co-ordinate co-operation between EU member-
states in the field of border security. The Border 
Guards have to date participated in five joint 
activities and operations within Frontex and 
expect to attend more.
In 2008, Moldova adopted the Law on Asylum 
in accordance with EU standards but with a 
few inconsistencies. However, there is too little 
involvement of civil society and the personnel 
working in this area still need to undergo 
exchange programmes and training.
The current legislation of Moldova in the area 
of migration is dispersed and, therefore, a 
national strategy on migration and asylum 
management is needed.
The elaboration of such a strategy in 2011 is 
envisaged by the authorities. There are also 
plans for the collection of data on migration 
flows by establishment of a mechanism of co-
ordination and an extended migration profile 
that will contribute to data collection and 
analysis of migration tendencies in Moldova.
Moldova has implemented programmes and 
projects for controlling migration flows, but the 
results have not yet been seen. The reason for this 
is the lack of co-ordination among the institutions 
and some inconsistencies related to the status 
of foreigners on the territory of Moldova. The 
problems for controlling migration flows come 
from Transnistria.
Moldova is part of the EU Mobility Partnership, 
a pilot instrument designed to manage the 
migration flows to the benefit of all the parties: 
EU, partner states and migrants.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
• To increase the role of EUBAM in assisting 
the establishment of a higher degree of 
co-operation between the Ukrainian and 
Moldovan border police authorities;
• To quickly move to define the future status 
of the Border Guard Service;
• To enhance co-operation between the 
state authorities and NGOs in the area of 
immigration. 
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A draft of the National Migration Policy 
Concept has been debated in the government, 
Parliament and in public discussions.
It is recommended that a unified migration 
service be established. Such an institution could 
regulate and co-ordinate migration and asylum 
policy, tackle and combat illegal migration. 
The problems in this area are connected to the 
existing division of responsibilities.
Ukraine is not a part of the Mobility Partnership 
project with the EU. 
An analysis on the migration potential 
of Ukraine indicates that in the area of 
migration management Ukraine still has 
deficiencies both in terms of legislation and 
proper institutional building. The State Border 
Service is in a rather slow process of reforms, 
while the State Migration Service is in the 
process of formation.
Migration policy institutions require serious 
reforms, which are not possible without high-
quality strategic planning, co-ordination, 
resources and political will.
Legislative reform is firmly recommended, 
and it should ensure good co-ordination of the 
migration policy implemented by all relevant 
institutions and monitoring of the migration 
flows and regulating the asylum policy.
Co-ordination of migration policy should be 
ensured at a high governmental level in order to 
overcome administrative resistance, which will 
arise because of the inevitable redistribution of 
power and resources.
georgia
On 11 February 2004, the State Border 
Defence Department was transformed into he 
Border Police Department of Georgia. The new 
law on the Border Police of Georgia, adopted 
in December 2006, defines the agency’s status 
as a partially independent law-enforcement 
service within the Ministry of Interior headed by 
a Deputy Minister of Interior.  The establishment 
and reforms of the Georgian Border Police 
Service have been supported by the Office of 
the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the 
South Caucasus since 2005.
The EUSR Border Support Team have 
spearheaded the development and 
implementation of the Integrated Border 
Management Strategy of Georgia with an 
interagency commission. The Strategy, signed 
by the President in 2008, is based on a common 
border management model, which incorporates 
all four steps of border management: 
• coherent and co-ordinated activities among 
relevant government agencies; 
• efficient border control; 
• co-operation with neighbouring countries; 
• promotion of  preventive measures in the third 
country.
The Action Plan on the Strategy, signed in 
December 2009, co-ordinates and regulates 
the line ministries and the agencies to implement 
the reforms of border management in Georgia in 
accordance with EU requirements. Investment in 
equipment and infrastructure is an integral part 
of the development plan. The EU Border Support 
Team (BST) is involved in implementation of the 
action plan of a border management strategy 
and in building the capacity of the Georgian 
Border Guard.
Demarcation and delimitation of Georgia’s 
borders still represent a serious issue for the 
country and its relationship with its neighbours. 
Georgia has a 2,154 km length border with 
other states ( including 315 km of sea border), 
and the state operates 18 actual border 
crossings, of which 15 have international, and 
three have interstate, status.
Among the four states neighbouring Georgia, 
the demarcation problem remains with 
three of them: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and 
Russia. Georgia is continuing a dialogue 
and conducting negotiations with Armenia 
and Azerbaijan on border demarcation and 
delimitation.
The main concern of the Georgian government 
relates to the Georgia-Russia border and the 
issue of the occupied territories of Georgia. As 
a result of the two conflicts that broke out in the 
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both territories, and helps to de-escalate rising 
tension.
The working agreement between Frontex and 
Georgia, signed on 12 April 2008, established 
new mechanisms for Georgia-EU co--operation 
and channels for information exchange and co-
ordination of joint operational measures. 
The Georgian government has made 
important reforms in the area of border 
control and management. The country 
managed to establish a border service with 
policing functions, elaborated an integrated 
border management strategy and started its 
implementation. Georgia has also developed 
successful co-operation with Frontex and has 
facilitated the return of illegal migrants.
However, serious challenges remain with the 
demarcation and delimitation of the borders 
with the three neighbouring countries - 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia.
On 16 February 2010, EU-Georgia co-
operation in the framework of the Mobility 
Partnership was officially launched. According 
to official statements, Georgia’s main priority is 
to facilitate legal labour movement, including 
concluding agreements on labour and circular 
migration with the EU member-states. 
In 2010, an independent governmental 
commission for migration was established 
consisting of all 11 government agencies 
involved in migration management. Apart from 
interagency co-operation, the commission’s 
functions include developing strategic 
documents, a single integrated migration 
database, and preparation of proposals and 
recommendations for improvement of the 
migration management system. In May 2011, 
a working group was established under the 
state commission aiming at developing a 
national strategy on migration. 
So far, a migration strategy has not yet been 
adopted, although it is important that the 
government has to review the legal framework 
of its migration management practice and 
approve the quality of the administrative 
management - and all this has to be addressed 
at the policy level.
early 1990s, the Georgian government has not 
exerted control over its breakaway territories of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, including border 
crossings of these regions from and into Russia. 
After the 2008 war, Russian border guard 
servicemen established border checkpoints 
along the administrative boundary lines (ABL) 
that separate these territories from Georgia 
proper. Those boundary lines are not recognised 
by Georgia as state borders, and accordingly 
they are currently under the control of patrol 
police special units of Georgia. 
Georgian laws, in particular the Law on 
Occupied Territories (adopted in 2008 
and amended in February 2010), and the 
Regulation on Modalities for Engagement of 
Organisations Conducting Activities in the 
Occupied Territories (adopted in October 
2010), strictly regulate movement and travel 
to, and outside of, borders of persons who are 
residing in the occupied territories, citizens of 
foreign countries seeking asylum, or victims of 
human trafficking. Besides, citizens of Georgia, 
in particular internally displaced persons (IDP) 
from the breakaway regions, are allowed only 
to enter the breakaway regions when they have 
been cleared by the de facto authorities and the 
Russian border guard.
Taking into account that Russian and Georgian 
state agencies have no co-operation and 
institutional contacts, and that diplomatic 
relationships were broken off after the war in 
2008, it is very important that an international 
presence be established and remain along the 
administrative boundary lines (ABL) that separate 
the breakaway territories and Georgia proper. 
Until then the only international body present 
close to the conflict zones is the unarmed 
civilian personnel of the EU Monitoring Mission 
(EUMM). 
The EUMM’s scope of de facto engagement 
remains much more limited than its official 
mandate prescribes because the authorities in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia so far have denied 
access to the EUMM to the territories under 
their control. So, the presence of EUMM only 
facilitates direct contacts, utilises a telephone 
“hotline” system that functions in the context of 
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Georgia has to elaborate and adopt its 
migration policy with the aim to control and 
manage migration flows in and out of the 
country in line with the national interest, but 
also staying in harmony with EU goals.
Currently, the government is facing several 
challenges:
• economic and demographic effects of a 
great number of emigrants at a productive 
working age with possibly positive effects of 
remittances;
• the status of legal migrants and their entry 
conditions (according to experts, laws are very 
liberal and do not make any division between 
‘employed’ and ‘self-employed/investor’ 
categories);
• irregular and unwanted migration flows - 
the existent control mechanisms have to be 
strengthened.
The existing legislation in Georgia in the area 
of migration consists of a number of laws, 
regulations and instructions stipulating the rights 
of nationals, foreign nationals and stateless 
persons and regulating the issues of entry, 
issuance of the residents’ permits, return, and 
irregular migration. 
According to foreign experts’ reports, the 
legislation regulating the entry procedures 
consists of a number of shortfalls. The concerns 
are connected with the absence of specific 
labour migration legislation and the procedures 
of granting residence permits based on labour 
contracts. According to the Georgian law on 
the Legal Status of Aliens, no work permit is 
necessary in order to obtain a residence permit 
based on employment grounds. 
At the same time, article 66 of the same law 
foresees the establishment of a unified migration 
data bank, which is still not a fact. This very 
law, adopted in 2005 and amended several 
times since then, still has several flaws and 
deficiencies leaving it short of corresponding 
to EU criteria and standards in the migration 
area (e.g. no provisions to address the interests 
of the most vulnerable asylum-seekers - females 
and children).
A new law on Refugees and Persons with 
Humanitarian Status was drafted in 2010, 
which is to be reviewed by the government  in 
2011.
It may be concluded that Georgia has not yet 
developed and implemented a sustainable 
migration policy management fulfilling the EU 
criteria.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
• developing a mechanism for monitoring 
and regulating the migration flows in and out 
of Georgia
 
• establishing better co-ordination between 
the institutions/stakeholders that hold 
migration information, and securing its 
smooth exchange
• creating a unified database for monitoring 
migration processes - which will connect all 
relevant public institutions
• identifying an agency that would manage 
the database and coordinate the entire 
process. 
PUblIc orDEr  
AnD SEcUrIty
Fight against Organised Crime and 
Corruption
moldova
While Moldova does not have a strategy 
on combating organised crime, the country 
implements well its Strategy on money laundering 
and financing terrorism (adopted in 2007) 
with the  Law on Preventing and Combating 
Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing. 
The implementation, however, lacks better co-
ordination among law enforcement bodies and 
better compliance with the EU criteria in the 
operative investigation procedure by the Police 
department. Moldova has also ratified the 
Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, 
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The National Implementation Programme on 
Visa Liberalisation envisages signing a Co-
operation Agreement with Eurojust in 2011.
The authorities are also planning to improve 
the legal framework in terms of mutual judicial 
assistance and enforcement of the international 
treaties adopted by Moldova, as well as 
exchange of experience between judges and 
prosecutors with their counterparts from the EU 
member-states.
In conclusion, it is noteworthy that Moldova 
has serious problems in combating high-level 
corruption that might create a problem for visa 
liberalisation.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
• more corruption cases should be uncovered;
• effective actions to be taken against 
organised crime and money laundering;
• more efforts and political will for the reforms 
at the Ministry of Interior with particular 
attention in respect of human rights.
ukraine
During the recent period, Ukraine has taken 
steps in terms of adopting legislation, signing 
international agreements and developing 
regulations for combating organised crime, 
corruption, trafficking in human beings, 
smuggling, and drug-trafficking.
The country, however, still lacks comprehensive 
strategy on  organised crime and corruption.
In September 2010, the Parliament ratified 
the Council of Europe Convention on Action 
against Trafficking in Human Beings.
Ukraine ratified the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime in 2004, 
together with additional protocols against 
a) trade in human beings and b) illegal 
transportation of migrants.
In September 2010, the cabinet adopted a 
Concept of an anti-drug policy and the fight 
against the illegal circulation of drugs and 
psychotropic substances for 2011-2015.
Search, Seizure and Confiscation or Proceeds 
of Crime and Financing of Terrorism. The body 
in charge for combating money laundering 
is the Office for Prevention and Combating 
Money Laundering, an autonomous subdivision 
of the Centre for Combating Economic Crimes 
and Corruption Agency.
In 2000, Moldova signed and ratified the UN 
Convention against Transnational Organised 
Crime.
Trafficking in human beings (THB) is also an 
issue of concern. Although the co-ordination 
of the stakeholders (governmental, non-
governmental and international institutions) in 
this area functions well, Moldova doesn’t have 
a strategy on combating trafficking in human 
beings. The Law on Preventing and Combating 
Human Trafficking, adopted in 2005, the 
establishment of the Centre for Combating 
Trafficking in Human Beings in 2006, and 
the creation of a co-ordinating Council of the 
law enforcement agencies contributed to better 
information exchange and more effective and 
efficient results in the fight against human 
trafficking in recent years.
Moldova has a strategic partnership with Europol 
and is looking forward to closer co-operation in 
the form of an operational partnership allowing 
for the exchange of personal data. Such a 
partnership will take place after the adoption 
of the new data protection law whose draft is 
under public debate at the moment. Moldova 
has signed the Council of Europe Convention 
for Protection of Individuals with regard to 
automatic processing of individuals and is in 
the process of signing an additional protocol.
In spite of the many legislative and 
administrative steps the country has taken so far 
in this area, one of the most under-reformed 
institutions remains the Ministry of Interior, 
which has to go through demilitarisation and 
professionalisation based on the best practices 
from the EU member-states. Violent behaviour 
and a high degree of corruption among the 
police has a negative impact on their image. 
Expectations and needs are both high for 
inter- and intra- agency law enforcement co-
operation. Overlapping and inefficiency plague 
the work of police departments.
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According to international organisations and 
experts, Ukraine does not effectively combat 
corruption. The country fails to implement 
sufficiently the recommendations made in 
GRECO evaluations reports.
In June 2009, the Parliament passed a package 
of laws expanding the list of entities involved in 
corrupt activities and establishing anti-corruption 
measures in the civil service. However, their 
implementation has been postponed twice, 
and finally the anti-corruption package was 
abandoned by the Parliament due to the 
submission of a new law by the President of 
Ukraine.
The new anti-corruption law (which provides a 
softer anti-corruption approach than the previous 
ones) was adopted on 12 May.
Ukraine has ratified the Council of Europe 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
regard to Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data and the additional protocol to that 
Convention regarding supervisory authorities 
and transborder data flows. 
The Law on Personal Data Protection was 
adopted in July 2010, and the data protection 
system is in the process of formation. In May 
2011, the newly created State Service for Data 
Protection under the Minister of Justice started 
organising the tender for experts to work on the 
system.
However, the Data Protection law has not 
passed through sufficient international 
screening or assessment (e.g. Venice 
Commission). Human rights activists express 
some concerns regarding possible misuse of that 
law. The chapter of the data protection body 
does not stipulate clearly its independence. 
In conclusion, it may be said that Ukraine 
has a variety of problems in the area of the 
fight against corruption and organised crime. 
The obvious lack of confidence between law 
enforcement bodies of Ukraine and those 
of the EU member-states is an important 
additional element contributing negatively to 
the overall picture.
The Ministry of Interior in Ukraine remains 
under-reformed, a Soviet type centralised and 
heavy structure with a minister who is also the 
actual commander of the country’s police. There 
is no integral database with direct access to the 
entire territory for relevant bodies dealing with 
public security. Hence, there is no co-ordination 
mechanism between all of them.
The Ministry of Interior has 30 departments and 
three agencies that are subordinated to it. The 
minister has up to eight deputies (other than his 
first deputy) that head the main departments 
of the ministry. In March 2010, the new 
minister decided to abandon the Ministry’s 
Department for human rights protection, a 
step strongly criticised by the human rights 
activists and ignored by the Minister. At the 
same time departments like Internal Troops, a 
paramilitary unit with A deeply rooted Soviet 
legacy, still exist at the Ministry and, in this 
case, is responsible for domestic security.
Reports of torture and other ill-treatment by law 
enforcement officials and the authorities’ failure 
to carry out effective investigations continue. 
Ukraine ratified the Optional Protocol to the 
UN Convention against Torture in 2006, but 
had still not set up a national mechanism for 
monitoring places of detention in accordance 
with its obligations under the Protocol.
All law enforcement and security bodies are 
totally dependent on the President, who (due to 
questionable constitutional changes of October 
2010) can fire ministers, the Prosecutor 
General, the Security Service chief without even 
consultations with the Parliament (appointments 
need parliamentary approval, except the 
Security Service chief).
In December 2009, the Ministry of Interior 
signed an Agreement on Strategic Co-operation 
with Europol (Framework agreement). An 
operational agreement is not in place yet,and 
is connected to the absence of data protection 
legislation in Ukraine. 
Corruption remains a serious problem 
in Ukrainian society. According to the 
Transparency International 2009 Global 
Corruption Barometer, public officials and civil 
servants are the most affected by corruption.
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Georgia ratified the Palermo Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons in 
2006 and the Council of Europe Convention 
on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings 
on 14 March 2007. The Law on Combating 
Trafficking in Persons was also adopted and 
entered into force in 2006. The Law is based 
on the principle of 3 “Ps”: protection of victims, 
prevention of trafficking, and prosecution of 
traffickers. It envisages the introduction of the 
State Fund for Protection of and Assistance to 
Victims, setting up of a shelter, creating the Co-
ordination Council for Combating Trafficking in 
persons, forming a database of traffickers, and 
elaborating a National Referral Mechanism. 
In accordance with an article from the law, 
an Interagency Coordination Council for 
the prevention of Human Trafficking was 
established in 2006, chaired by the Minister of 
Justice with representatives from governmental, 
non-governmental and international institutions. 
On 19 July 2007, the Council adopted the 
Rehabilitation and Integration Strategy for 
Victims of Trafficking.
The legislative changes, together with the 
efficient reforms carried out in the Ministry of 
Interior, contributed to a more effective and 
successful fight against organised crime and a 
decrease in crime rates. The reformed police and 
judiciary have developed better co-operation 
with their European counterparts - which led 
to successful investigation of large organised 
criminal groups in Spain and Belgium.
At the same time, several studies show that 
public trust in the enforcement agencies is not 
high enough. The results of crime surveys 
carried out in 2010 discover victims’ ill 
treatment on the part of the police authorities. 
According to some researchers, the steps 
often taken by the police have been quasi-
legal and demonstrate disrespect for the rule 
of law. 
It should be noted that the implemented  anti-
crime and anti-corruption policy has never 
been the subject of supervision or debate by 
public or non-governmental bodies.
The National Anti-corruption Strategy was 
approved in 2005, followed by an Action Plan 
which was signed by the President in March 
2006.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
• elaboration of strategies on the fight 
against organised crime, corruption and 
human trafficking;
• implementation effectively and efficiently of 
existing legislation;
• reforming entirely the law enforcement 
institutions and mainly the Ministry of Interior;
• improving inter- and intra- agency co-
operation.
georgia
Fighting corruption and organised crime has 
been one of the main priorities of the country 
since the presidential elections in 2004.
At the end of 2005, a new law on Organised 
Crime and Racketeering was signed by the 
President and passed by the Parliament.
In December 2005, Georgia signed the UN 
Convention on Organised Crime, and ratified it 
in September 2006.
The new legislation, including amendments to the 
Criminal Code, introduced the new terminology 
‘thief in law’ and ‘the world of thieves’, and has 
made the fight against transnational crime much 
more effective in Georgia. The law has enabled 
the law enforcement structures to identify these 
kind of criminals, confiscate their property, and 
hand it over to the state. The legislation has 
also defined measures against racketeering, 
racket groups and racketeers, and has made 
it possible for the state to seize illegally earned 
property from accused individuals without 
reimbursement in favour of the state. The new 
legislation has also focused on the protection 
of victims and witnesses of organised criminal 
activities.
Over the past several years, the government 
has made serious efforts in combating 
human trafficking. New legislation and 
a new institutional framework have been 
developed in this area. New mechanisms for 
victims’ protection and assistance have been 
established.
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In 2010, a working group under the Ministry of 
Justice, with participation of non-governmental 
institutions and the private sector, elaborated 
a draft law on personal data protection. The 
final approval of the draft by the Parliament is 
expected in 2011.
Experts who reviewed the draft law underline 
the importance of the law and the urgency of its 
adoption, but at the same time mentioned several 
flaws. First of all, they express their concern 
about the vagueness of the law’s provisions, 
which provides the entitled state agency access 
to a special category of personal data, such 
as racial and ethnic category, religious and 
political beliefs, health conditions, etc. Those 
data are considered very sensitive and should 
not be as easy accessible as they will become 
after the adoption of the new law.
In conclusion, it could be said that Georgia 
has made enormous efforts to prioritise the 
fight against organised crime and corruption, 
as well as to pass and adopt the package of 
new legislation in the parliament over a short 
period of time.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
• wider public discussions of the draft 
legislation in the area;
• no ill treatment and more respect of human 
rights by the police authorities towards 
detainees;
• better fight against high-level corruption;
• well established data protection system in 
the country.
ExtErnAl rElAtIonS AnD 
FUnDAMEntAl rIghtS
moldova
This is a rather small, but very important part 
of the Action Plans. However, it reveals the 
most delicate and sensitive issues that show the 
democratic development of the country.
There are no cases reported of violation of 
While  a lot of  studies confirm that corruption 
has been widely eradicated from citizens’ daily 
life, many civil society representatives and 
representatives of international organisations 
believe that high-level corruption has not yet 
been combated sufficiently, and there are 
concerns about corruption in some areas of 
governance.
On 26 December 2008, the President of 
Georgia signed the Decree on Formation of 
a new Interagency Coordination Council of 
Combating Corruption. The functions of the 
Interagency Council include: coordination of 
anticorruption activities in the country, update 
of anticorruption action plan and strategy as 
well as supervision of their implementation, 
monitoring accountability towards international 
organisations, initiation of relevant legislative 
activities, and drafting recommendations. The 
head of the interagency is the Ministry of Justice 
of Georgia.
On 26 April 2010, the Council endorsed 
the new Draft of the National Anti-corruption 
Strategy and submitted it to the President. On 
3 June 2010 the new National Anti-corruption 
Strategy was adopted.
The process of privatisation has been a subject 
of criticism from the point of view of corrupt 
practices. The 2006 GRECO (Groups of 
States Against Corruption) report confirmed 
the findings. It observed that the privatisation 
process was conducted in a way such that it 
remained unclear to whom this property had 
been transferred or sold, and whether anyone 
apart from the state benefited from it.
In its Compliance Report on Georgia 
(Second Round Evaluation Report), adopted 
in May 2009,  GRECO concluded that 
out of 14 recommendations eight had 
been fully implemented, while the other 
six recommendations had been partially 
implemented.
Georgia signed and ratified the Council 
of Europe Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regards to Automatic Processing 
of Personal Data.
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• Better treatment of detained and imprisoned 
people and better conditions in detention 
centres;
• Signing and ratification of European and 
international Conventions relating to mutual 
legal assistance and extradition to which 
Ukraine is not a part;
• Developing in a transparent way a new 
legislation on elections, taking into account 
the violations of October 2010 local elections;
• Adopting and implementing comprehensive 
anti-discrimination legislation;
• Strengthening the requirements for the 
acquisition of Ukrainian citizenship according 
to EU regulations.
georgia
A strong and independent judiciary, the rule of 
law, protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms are among the priorities of the EU-
Georgia co-operation framework documents. 
Nevertheless, the judicial system in the country 
has been acknowledged as one of the areas 
in need of serious reforms. The problems in 
the area of judicial independence hamper 
economic growth in the country and make 
impossible the proper protection of human 
rights in Georgia.
At the same time, Georgia has expressed strong 
commitment to start the EU-Georgia Human 
Rights Dialogue. Starting in 2009, three rounds 
of talks have taken place, and the issue of 
the freedom of assembly and association has 
always been among key concerns about the 
human rights situation in Georgia raised by the 
EU. 
In 2011, Georgia accepted recommendation 
105.64, proposed by the Czech Republic to 
“safeguard full and unhampered enjoyment 
of freedom of expression”. Georgia should 
accept another recommendation on the right to 
assembly and to demonstrate at the upcoming 
session of the UN Human Rights Council in June 
2011.
However, recent practices in Georgia indicate 
the access to travel and identity documents by 
minority or vulnerable groups in Moldova.
In 2010, Moldova and the EU started the 
Human Rights Dialogue, the objective of which 
is to raise and address human rights issues more 
deeply with the achievement of concrete results 
and to enhance the dialogue on the topics in 
multilateral fora. As a part of the dialogue, 
the Government adopted the Human Rights 
National Action Plan in September 2010 
which foresees Moldova’s accession to some 
international instruments, to which the country 
has not yet become party, and outlines a series 
of measures and actions to be taken for better 
access to justice, improvement of the national 
mechanism of human rights, and professional 
training.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
• speedy and better implementation of the 
Human Rights Action Plan;
• adoption and efficient implementation of 
anti-discrimination legislation;
• training and information campaigns of 
certain institutions for the protection of 
minority and vulnerable groups;
• more programmes for integration of Roma 
minorities.
ukraine
The Ukrainian Government seems open for 
dialogue with the Council of Europe, the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OSCE) and other international 
organisations dealing with human rights and 
liberties. However, their recommendations are 
often ignored.
Basically, human and minorities rights in Ukraine 
are protected, but some substantial shortcomings 
are indicated, especially concerning the rights 
of detained and imprisoned people.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
A network of independent policy centres  
in Central and Eastern Europe  
and Central Asia
www.pasos.org
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that authorities are limiting the right to freedom 
of peaceful assembly. Amendments to the 
Georgian Law on Assembly and Manifestations 
introduced in July 2009 restrict the right to 
assemble in front of official buildings and 
establish a more burdensome procedure to 
receive authorisation. There has been an 
increased tendency to use excessive force 
when peaceful protesters have been arrested or 
violently dispersed by law enforcement forces 
upon expressing their demands. 
The EU Progress reports from 2008-2010 
and the official statements of high-level EU 
representatives stress that media freedom and 
pluralism remain an issue of concern. However, 
some positive changes have been noted by 
the former OSCE Representative on freedom 
of the media (an opposition channel received 
a broadcast licence and political opposition 
has free access to the nationwide public 
broadcaster).
RECOMMENDATIONS:
• Weaknesses of the judiciary should be 
speedily addressed;
• Georgia should start a Human Rights 
Dialogue with the EU and should adopt an 
Action Plan in the area;
• Media freedom and pluralism should not 
remain an unsolved problem in the country;
• Georgia should sign all the relevant EU 
and international conventions in the area of 
human rights protection;
• Force and ill treatment by the police should 
be terminated.
concluSionS
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have taken 
ambitious steps towards transition during the 
past decade. In order to finalise the process of 
reforms, they will certainly need the support and 
assistance of the EU’s old and new democracies. 
They have to examine the lessons learned by 
most of the new EU member-states, especially 
by countries like Bulgaria and Romania, which 
are subject to the EU monitoring mechanism 
concerning the fight against organised crime 
and corruption. It is in the EU’s interest to support 
those of the Eastern Partnership countries  that 
are making efforts to achieve the essential values 
and principles on which EU member-states have 
been built, i.e. human rights, democracy, and 
the rule of law.
The Action Plans on Visa Liberalisation, 
presented to date to Ukraine and Moldova, 
are definitely stepping-stones towards visa-
free travel for the citizens of the two countries. 
Georgia will most probably be the next one 
to receive a similar Action Plan. However, the 
set of reforms and measures the three countries 
have to implement to achieve visa liberalisation 
are very demanding. The process has to be 
based on merit and thus be achievable. 
The EU should continue to assist Ukraine , 
Moldova and hopefully soon Georgia in their 
efforts to implement the benchmarks from the 
Action Plans that require co-operation with 
the EU on migration, mobility, and security. 
Concrete measures have to be taken by the 
three countries to prevent irregular migration, 
control the borders effectively, ensure 
document security, and fight organised crime 
and corruption. Gradual steps towards visa 
liberalisation should be considered on a case-
by-case basis, when and where the conditions 
for well managed and secure mobility are in 
place.
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This policy study was written as part of the project, Paving the Road towards Visa-free Travel between the Eastern Partnership 
countries and the EU, carried out with the support of the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative (LGI) of Open Society 
Foundations.
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